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Abstract
Adversarial attacks add perturbations to the input features with the intent
of changing the classification produced by a machine learning system. Small
perturbations can yield adversarial examples which are misclassified despite be-
ing virtually indistinguishable from the unperturbed input. Classifiers trained
with standard neural network techniques are highly susceptible to adversarial
examples, allowing an adversary to create misclassifications of their choice.
We introduce a new type of network unit, called MWD (max of weighed
distance) units that have a built-in resistant to adversarial attacks. These units
are highly non-linear, and we develop the techniques needed to effectively train
them. We show that simple interval techniques for propagating perturbation
effects through the network enables the efficient computation of robustness (i.e.,
accuracy guarantees) for MWD networks under any perturbations, including
adversarial attacks.
MWD networks are significantly more robust to input perturbations than
ReLU networks. On permutation invariant MNIST, when test examples can
be perturbed by 20% of the input range, MWD networks provably retain ac-
curacy above 83%, while the accuracy of ReLU networks drops below 5%. The
provable accuracy of MWD networks is superior even to the observed accuracy
of ReLU networks trained with the help of adversarial examples. In the ab-
sence of adversarial attacks, MWD networks match the performance of sigmoid
networks, and have accuracy only slightly below that of ReLU networks.
∗The authors are listed in alphabetical order.
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1 Introduction
Machine learning via deep neural networks has been remarkably successful in a
wide range of applications, including speech recognition, image classification, and
language processing. While very successful, deep neural networks are susceptible to
adversarial examples: small, carefully crafted, perturbations of inputs can change
their predicted classification [SZS+13]. These perturbations can often be so small as
to make human detection difficult or impossible; this has been shown both in the case
of images [SZS+13, NYC15] and sounds [KGB16a, CW18]. Further, the adversarial
examples are in some sense transferable from one neural network to another ([GSS14,
NYC15, PMJ+16, TPG+17]), so they can be crafted even without precise knowledge
of the targeted network’s parameters. At a fundamental level, it is hard to be
confident about the behavior of a deep neural network when most correctly classified
inputs are in close proximity to very similar, yet differently classified inputs.
The dominant approach for increasing a neural network’s resistance to ad-
versarial attacks is to augment the training data with adversarial examples
[GSS14, MMS+17]. If the added adversarial examples are generated by efficient
heuristics such as the fast gradient sign method, the networks learn to associate the
specific adversarial examples with the corresponding unperturbed input in a phe-
nomenon known as label leaking [KGB16b, MMS+17, TKP+17]. This does not result
in increased resistance to more general adversarial attacks [MMS+17, CW17b]. Net-
works with greater resistance to adversarial attacks can be obtained if the adversarial
examples used in training are generated via more general optimization techniques,
as in [MMS+17]. This comes at the cost of a more complex and computationally
expensive training regime, as well as an increase in network’s capacity.
Here we propose a different approach, the use of neural network units that are
inherently resistant to adversarial attacks, even when trained using only unperturbed
input. [GSS14] connect the presence of adversarial examples to the (local) linearity
of neural networks. Consider the linear form
∑n
i=1 xiwi and perturbing each xi by
, taking xi +  if wi > 0, and xi −  if wi < 0. The output is then perturbed by

∑n
i=1 |wi|, or nw¯ where w¯ the average magnitude of the wi’s. When the number
of inputs n is large, as is typical of deep neural networks, a small input perturbation
can cause a large output change, and this change can snowball through the layers.
Of course, deep neural networks are not globally linear, but the insight of [GSS14]
is that they may be sufficiently locally linear to promote the success of adversarial
attacks. Following this insight, we develop networks composed of units that are
highly non-linear.
After much experimentation, we found a promising node type that we call Max-
of-Weighted-Distance (MWD) units. Like Gaussian radial basis functions [BL88,
CCG91, Orr96], MWD units activate based on the distance from their input vectors
to a learned center. However, MWD units also learn a non-negative weight for each
input component and measure distance from the center with the weighted infinity-
2
norm rather than the Euclidean norm. The component weighing can give a high
sensitivity to some components while ignoring others, allowing a single MWD unit to
cover a more flexible region of the input space. The use of the infinity norm reduces
sensitivity to adversarial perturbations because any change in the output is due to
the perturbation of one input component, rather than the sum of the perturbations
to all of the input components. The output of a MWD unit U with parameters u
and w on input x is
U(u,w)(x) = exp
(
− max
1≤i≤n
(
ui(xi − wi)
)2)
. (1)
Using highly nonlinear models is hardly a new idea, but the challenge has been
that such models are typically difficult to train. Indeed, we found that networks with
MWD units cannot be satisfactorily trained using gradient descent. To get around
this, we show that the networks can be trained efficiently, and to high accuracy,
using pseudogradient descent where the pseudogradient is a proxy for the gradient
that facilitates training. The maximum operator in (1) has non-zero derivative only
for the maximizing input; our pseudogradient propagates a derivative signal back
to all of the inputs. Also, the exponential function in (1) is very flat far away
from the center, so our pseudogradient artificially widens the region of meaningful
gradients. Tampering with the gradient may seem unorthodox, but methods such
as AdaDelta ([Zei12]), and even gradient descent with momentum, cause training to
take a trajectory that does not follow pure gradient descent. We simply go one step
further, devising a scheme that operates at the granularity of the individual unit.
In order to prove accuracy bounds for MWD networks, we rely on the propaga-
tion of perturbation intervals thrugh the network. These are conservative estimates
to the set of values that can be produced at a network unit, when the network inputs
are subject to perturbation bounded by a specified amount. These technique can
be used to prove assertions such as “For any input perturbations of size at most
x in infinity norm, the network yields accuracy of at least y% on the testing set”.
The guarantees are dependent on the testing set, and in general, on the probability
distribution over the inputs, but this is intrinsic to any guarantee or performance
measure in machine learning. ReLU networks, even when trained with the help of
adversarial examples, can offer only very low accuracy guarantees. In contrast, we
show that networks of MWD units, even when trained normally, offer performance
lower-bounds under attack that are superior even to the (upper bounds) provided
by ReLU networks trained with adversarial examples.
To conduct our experiments, we have implemented MWD networks on top of
the PyTorch framework [PGC+17]. The code for the MWD networks is available
at https://github.com/rakshit-agrawal/mwd_nets. We consider permutation
invariant MNIST, which is a version of MNIST in which the 28 × 28 pixel im-
ages are flattened into a one-dimensional vector of 784 values and fed as a feature
vector to neural networks [GSS14]. On this test set, we show that for nets of
512,512,512,10 units, MWD networks match the classification accuracy of sigmoid
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networks ((96.96± 0.14)% for MWD vs. (96.88± 0.15)% for sigmoid), and are close
to the performance of network with ReLU units ((98.62 ± 0.08)%). When trained
over standard training sets, for input perturbations of 20% of the input range, MWD
networks guarantee an accuracy above 80% for any adversarial attack, while there
are simple attacks that reduce the accuracy of ReLU and Sigmoid networks to below
10% (random guessing). Even when ReLU networks are trained with the benefit of
adversarial attacks, for the most relevant range of input perturbations (from 5% to
25% of the input range), the accuracy lower bound guarantees offered by (normally
trained) MWD networks exceed the upper bounds of ReLU networks due to known
attacks.
Our results can be summarized as follows:
• We define a class of networks, MWD networks, inherently resistant to ad-
versarial attacks, and we develop a pseudogradient-based way for effectively
training them.
• On MNIST, we show that in absence of adversarial attacks, MWD networks
match the accuracy of sigmoid networks, and have only slightly lower accuracy
than ReLU networks.
• Again on MNIST, in presence of adversarial attacks, we show that the accu-
racy lower-bound guarantees of MWD networks far exceed the accuracy upper
bounds of ReLU and Sigmoid networks. We show that the accuracy lower
bounds of MWD networks are above the ReLU upper bounds even when the
latter are trained with the help of adversarial examples.
Much work remains to be done, including experimenting with MWD units in convo-
lutional networks. However, these initial results offer a practical method for training
networks that are provably — and significantly – resistant to adversarial attacks.
2 Related Work
The vulnerability of neural networks to adversarial examples was first reported by
[SZS+13], and they showed how to generate them via a simple optimization. [GSS14]
established a connection between linearity and adversarial attacks. A fully linear
form
∑n
i=1 xiwi can be perturbed to xi +  sign(wi), creating an output change of
magnitude ·∑ni=1 |wi|. In analogy, [GSS14] introduced the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) method of creating adversarial perturbations, by taking xi +  · sign(∇iL),
where ∇iL is the loss gradient with respect to input i. They also showed how
adversarial examples are often transferable across networks, and asked if non-linear
structures, perhaps like those of RBFs, would be more robust to adversarial attacks.
This paper pursues this approach and provides positive answers to the conjectures
and suggestions by [GSS14].
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It was recently discovered that training on adversarial examples generated via
FGSM does not confer strong resistance to attacks, as the network learns to asso-
ciate the specific examples generated by FGSM with the original training examples
in a phenomenon known as label leaking [KGB16b, MMS+17, TKP+17]. The FGSM
method for generating adversarial examples was extended to an iterative method,
I-FGSM, in [KGB16a]. In [TKP+17], it is shown that using small random perturba-
tions before applying FSGM enhances the robustness of the resulting network. The
network trained in [TKP+17] using I-FSGM and ensemble method won the first
round of the NIPS 2017 competition on defenses with respect to adversarial attacks.
Carlini and Wagner show that training regimes based on generating adversarial
examples via simple heuristics, or combinations of these, in general fail to convey
true resistance to attacks [CW17a, CW17b]. They further advocate measuring the
resistance to attacks with respect to adversarial examples created by more general
optimization processes. In particular, FGSM and I-FGSM rely on the local gradi-
ent, and training techniques that break the association between the local gradient
and the location of adversarial examples makes networks harder to attack via FGSM
and I-FGSM, without making the networks harder to attack via general optimization
techniques. We follow this suggestion by using a general optimization method, pro-
jected gradient descent (PGD), to generate adversarial attacks and evaluate network
robustness. [CW16, CW17b] also show that the technique of defensive distillation,
which consists in appropriately training a neural network on the output of another
[PMW+16], protects the networks from FGSM and I-FGSM attacks, but does not
improve network resistance in the face of general adversarial attacks.
[MMS+17] show that it is possible to obtain networks that are genuinely more
resistant to adversarial examples by training on adversarial examples generated via
PGD. The price to pay is a more computationally intensive training, and an increase
in the network capacity required. We provide an alternative way of achieving such
resistance that does not rely on a new training regime.
A technique based on differential analysis for deriving lower bounds to resis-
tance to adversarial attacks is presented in [PRGS17]. The technique requires the
feed-forward functions to be (locally) differentiable, and therefore does not provide
bound guarantees for networks including non-differentiable units, such as ReLU and
MWD networks. [Ehl17] use an interval propagation technique for bounding the
range of ReLU node activations before applying ILP and SAT-solver techniques to
verify network robustness. Our results show that for MWD networks, the simple
technique of forward propagating perturbation intervals gives meaningful robustness
guarantees.
3 MWD Networks
[GSS14] link adversarial attacks to the linearity of the models. In a linear form
g(x) =
∑
i xiwi, if we perturb xi by adding  when wi > 0, and subtracting it
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when wi < 0, the perturbations on the various inputs add up, so that small input
perturbations can yield large output changes. To achieve resistance to adversarial
attacks, we seek units where the contributions of the inputs are not added up. The
linear form represents the norm-2 distance of the input vector x to a hyperplane
perpendicular to vector w, scaled by |w| and its orientation. Our units will be based
instead on infinity-norm distances.
We define our units as variants of the classical Gaussian radial basis functions
[BL88, Orr96]. We call our variant Max-of-Weighted-Distance (MWD), to emphasize
the fact that they are built using infinity norm. An MWD unit U(u,w) for an
input in IRn is parameterized by two vectors of weights u = 〈u1, . . . , un〉 and w =
〈w1, . . . , wn〉 Given an input x ∈ IRn, the unit produces output
U(u,w)(x) = exp (−‖u (x−w)‖2∞) , (2)
where  is the Hadamard, or element-wise, product. In (2), the vector w is a point
from which the distance to x is measured in infinity norm, and the vector u provides
independent scaling factors for each coordinate. Without loss of expressiveness, we
require the scaling factors to be non-negative, that is, ui ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The scaling factors provide the flexibility of disregarding some inputs xi, by having
ui ≈ 0, while emphasizing the influence of other inputs. Expanding (2) gives:
U(u,w)(x) = exp
(
−max1≤i≤n
(
ui(xi − wi)
)2)
as in equation (1).
The output of MWD units are in (0, 1] and are close to 1 only when x is close to
w in the coordinates that have significant scaling factors. Thus, the unit functions
somewhat like an and gate, outputting 1 only when the relevant inputs take on a
particular set of values. We also consider the negated MWD unit which functions
somewhat like a nand gate: Uneg(u,w) = 1−U(u,w). We construct neural networks
out of MWD units using layers consisting of U units, layers consisting of Uneg units,
and mixed layers where the unit type is chosen at random at network initialization.
3.1 Training MWD Networks via Pseudogradients
The non-linearities in (1) make neural networks containing MWD units difficult to
train using standard gradient descent. The problems are associated with the max-
operator making the gradients sparse and the fast decay of Gaussian functions. Far
from its peak for x = w, a function of the form (1) is rather flat, and its derivative
may not be large enough top cause the vector of weights w to move towards useful
places in the input space during training. To obtain networks that are easy to train,
we replace the derivatives for exp and max with alternate functions, which we call
pseudoderivatives. These pseudoderivatives are then used in the chain-rule compu-
tation of the loss gradient in lieu of the true derivatives, yielding a pseudogradient.
Exponential function. In computing the partial derivatives of (2) via the chain
rule, the first step consists in computing ddz e
−z = −e−z . The problem is that −e−z
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is very close to 0 when z is large, and z in (1) is ‖u  (x − w)‖2∞, which can be
large. Hence, in the chain-rule computation of the gradient, we replace −e−z with
the “pseudoderivative” −1/√1 + z, which decays much more slowly.
Max. The gradient of y = max1≤i≤n zi, of course, is given by ∂y∂zi = 1 if zi = y,
and ∂y∂zi = 0 if zi < y. The problem is that this transmits feedback only to the
largest input(s). This slows down training and can create instabilities. We use as
pseudoderivative ezi−y, so that some gradient feedback is transmitted to the other
inputs zi based on their closeness to y.
One may be concerned that by using the loss pseudogradient as the basis of opti-
mization, rather than the true loss gradient, we may converge to solutions where the
pseudogradient is null, and yet, we are not at a minimum of the loss function. This
can indeed happen. We experimented with switching to training with true gradients
after the accuracy reached via pseudogradients plateaued; this increased the accu-
racy on the training set, but improved only slightly the accuracy on the testing set.
We also experimented with pseudogradients parameterized by a parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1],
such that when ρ = 0 the pseudogradients coincide with the true gradients. During
training the parameter ρ starts at 1 and then, as training proceeds, gradually decays
to 0, thus allowing a smooth transition from a pseudogradient training regime to a
standard gradient one. At least for MNIST, these more sophisticated schemes failed
to significantly improve on the simple use of the pseudogradients above.
4 Adversarial Examples
4.1 Generating Adversarial Examples
We describe the known methods for generating candidate adversarial examples that
we will use in the experiments. Consider a network trained with cost function
J(θ,x,y), where θ are the network parameters, x is the input, and y is the output.
Let ∇xJ(θ,x′,y) be the gradient of J wrt its second argument (the input) computed
at θ,x′,y. For a perturbation amount  > 0 and an input x belonging to the test
set, we produce candidate adversarial examples x˜ with ‖x − x˜‖∞ ≤  using the
following techniques.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [GSS14]. In the FGSM technique, the
candidate adversarial example is generated via:
x˜ = |[x+  sign(∇xJ(θ,x,y))]|10 , (3)
where |[x]|ba is the result of clamping each component of x to the range [a, b]; the
clamping is necessary to generate a valid MNIST image.
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Iterated Fast Gradient Sign Method (I-FGSM) [KGB16a]. The I-FGSM
attack computes a sequence x˜0, x˜1, . . . , x˜M , where x˜0 = x, and, for 0 ≤ i < M :
x˜i+1 =
∣∣∣[x˜i + 
M
sign(∇xJ(θ, x˜i,y))
]∣∣∣1
0
. (4)
We take x˜ = x˜M as the candidate adversarial example.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [MMS+17]. For an input x ∈ IRn and a
given maximum perturbation size  > 0, we consider the set B(x) ∩ [0, 1]n of valid
perturbations of x, and we perform projected gradient descent (PGD) in B(x) ∩
[0, 1]n of the negative loss with which the network has been trained (or, equivalently,
projected gradient ascent wrt. the loss). We perform this search with multiple
restarts, each chosen uniformly at random from B(x) ∩ [0, 1]n.
4.2 Lower Bounds via Interval Propagation
In order to obtain lower bounds for the accuracy of MWD networks subject
to adversarial attacks, we propagate through the network perturbation intervals
that represent an over-approximation of the range of values the output of a
network node can assume, when the input is subject to perturbations. More
sophisticated analysis methods exist, based on the propagation of invariants
[Ehl17, WK18, RSL18, MGV18], but for MWD, as we will see, strong bounds can
be obtained simply via such interval propagation.
The -perturbation of an input x is any x′ where ||x− x′||∞ ≤  and the input
belongs to the input domain. Given a classifier, an -adversarial example for input
x is an -perturbation of x that results in a different prediction. The true -attack
accuracy of a trained network is the fraction of test examples for which the network
predicts correctly and no -adversarial examples exist.
If the network input x′ is an -perturbation of x, then every node j outputs values
in its perturbation interval Ij (x). If the network predicts correctly on some test
example x and every combination of values within the output nodes’ -perturbation
intervals lead to the same prediction, then x has no -adversary examples so x can
be counted towards the network’s true -attack accuracy.
In particular, consider a classification problem with n classes, and a classifier
network f with n outputs, y1, . . . , yn. Input x (belonging to, say, class 1) is classified
correctly by y = f(x) if y1 > yk for k = 2, . . . , n. To rule out the existence of -
attacks for x, it suffices to check that l1 > rk for k = 2, . . . , n, where [lk, rk] = Ik(x)
is the -perturbation interval for output k = 1, . . . , n and input vector x.
For many node types the perturbation intervals are easy to compute. In
particular, for an MWD node, let [l1, r1], . . . , [ln, rn] be the perturbation inter-
vals of its n inputs for a given x, and denote by f(·) the node function, de-
fined as by (2). Its output perturbation interval [l, r] for x can be computed via
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l = max1≤i≤n min
{
f(li), f(ri)
}
, and r = max1≤i≤nmi, where
mi =
{
1 if li ≤ wi ≤ ri
max
{
f(li), f(ri)
}
otherwise.
Computing these input-dependent perturbation intervals takes effort comparable to
(perhaps 2× or 3×) that of calculating the network’s output.
5 Experimental Setup
We implemented MWD networks in the PyTorch framework [PGC+17]. To imple-
ment pseudogradients, we extend PyTorch with two new functions: a LargeAt-
tractorExp function, with forward behavior e−x and backward gradient propa-
gation according to −1/√1 + x, and SharedFeedbackMax, with forward behavior
y = maxni=1 xi and backward gradient propagation according to e
xi−y. These two
functions are used in the definition of MWD units, as per (1), with the AutoGrad
mechanism of PyTorch providing backward (pseudo)gradient propagation for the
complete networks.
Dataset. We use the MNIST dataset [LBBH98] for our experiments, following the
standard setup of 60,000 training examples and 10,000 testing examples. Each digit
image was flattened to a one-dimensional feature vector of length 28×28 = 784, and
fed to a fully-connected neural network; this is the so-called permutation-invariant
MNIST.
Neural networks. We compared the accuracy of ReLU, sigmoid, and MWD net-
works. The output of ReLU networks [NH10] is fed into a softmax, and the network
is trained via cross-entropy loss. Sigmoid and MWD networks are trained via square-
error loss, which worked better than other losses in our experiments. We trained
all networks with the AdaDelta optimizer [Zei12], which gave good results for all
networks considered.
Attacks. We applied FGSM and I-FGSM attacks to the whole test set. In I-FGSM
attacks, we performed 10 iterations of (4). As PGD attacks are computationally
intensive, we apply them to one run only, and we compute the performance under
PGD attacks for the first 2,000 inputs in the test set for ReLU and Sigmoid networks,
and for 1,000 inputs for MWD networks. For each input x in the test set, we perform
100 PGD searches, or restarts. Each search starts from a random point in B(x)
and then does 100 steps of projected gradient descent using the AdaDelta algorithm
to tune step size; if at any step a misclassified example is generated, the attack is
considered successful.
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Network Accuracy FGSM, =0.3 I-FGSM, =0.3 PGD, =0.3
ReLU 98.62± 0.08 1.98± 0.42 0.06± 0.06 81.20
Sigmoid 96.88± 0.15 0.71± 0.43 0.11± 0.11 40.75
MWD 96.96± 0.14 94.90± 0.35 93.27± 0.48 92.30
MWD[psd] 96.96± 0.14 85.88± 2.02 78.92± 1.91 90.70
Table 1: Performance of 512-512-512-10 networks for MNIST testing input, and for
input corrupted by adversarial attacks computed with perturbation size  = 0.3.
For MWD networks, we can perform FGSM, I-FGSM, and PGD attacks based
either on true gradient, or on the pseudogradients. We denote the pseudogradient-
based attacks with [psd] in the figures and tables. Such attacks in general are more
powerful than attacks based on the regular gradient, for the same reasons why the
pseudogradient is more effective in training.
6 Results
Unless otherwise noted, we report results on networks with layers of 512, 512, 512,
and 10 units. For MWD networks, the layers consist of U , Uneg, U , Uneg units
respectively, and we use a bound of [0.01, 3] for the components of the u-vectors,
and of [0, 1] for the w-vectors, the latter corresponding to the value range of MNIST
pixels.
Accuracy. In Table 1 we summarize the accuracies of networks trained on the
MNIST training set, as measured both on the (un-perturbed) test set, and upper
bounds on the true =0.3-attack accuracy provided by the various adversarial at-
tacks. The results are computed as the average of 10 training runs for ReLU and
Sigmoid networks, and of 5 runs for MWD and MWD[psd]. In each run we used
different random seeds for weight initialization; each run consisted of 30 training
epochs. In a result of the form a ± e, a is the percentage accuracy, and e is the
standard deviation in the accuracy of the individual runs.
In absence of perturbations, MWD networks lose (1.66 ± 0.21)% performance
compared to ReLU networks (from (98.62±0.07)% to (96.96±0.14)%), and perform
comparably to sigmoid networks (the difference is below the standard deviation of
the results). When heuristic perturbations are present, the performance of MWD
networks is superior. I-FGSM attacks are usually the most effective.
In Figure 1 we compare the performance of the networks subjected to I-FGSM
and PGD attacks for attack amplitudes up to  = 0.5. The error bars in this and
subsequent graphs indicate the standard deviation across the runs, when available.
For MWD networks, we plot only attacks based on pseudogradient, as they are more
effective. We also omitted the results for FGSM, as it is a weaker attack than its
iterated version I-FGSM. We see that for ReLU and Sigmoid networks, I-FGSM is
10
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Figure 1: Performance of ReLU, Sigmoid, and MWD networks in presence of PGD
and I-FGSM attacks.
the strongest attack, giving a rapidly-decaying upper bound on the networks’ true
-attack accuracy. For MWD networks, the relative strength of I-FGSM and PGD
attacks depends on the intensity .
Comparing lower bounds for MWD with upper bounds for ReLU, Sig-
moid. Figure 2 compares the lower bound on the true -attack accuracy of MWD
networks with the best upper bounds on the true -attack accuracy from the various
attacks on the MWD, Sigmoid, and ReLU networks. The lower bound for MWD
networks is computed with the methods of Section 4.2, and holds for all possible
adversarial attacks (or perturbations). The upper bound for MWD is derived as
the minimum of the curves for PGD[psd] and I-FGSM[psd] in Figure 1. The up-
per bounds for ReLU and Sigmoid networks are derived from I-FGSM attacks, as
they are (in our setting) strictly more powerful than PGD attacks for these net-
works. The upper bounds are not tight: they could be strengthened by performing
stronger attacks. The lower bound for MWD is also unlikely to be tight since it is
based on an approximate analysis (see Section 4.2).
Even with these approximations, there is a large accuracy gap between the lower
bound guarantee for MWD and the upper bounds for ReLU and Sigmoid networks.
The gap is a visual indication of the stronger resistance to attacks of MWD networks.
For  ≤ 0.2, the figure shows that the gap between the upper and lower bounds for
MWD is relatively small, indicating that the lower bounds of Section 4.2 are fairly
accurate in this regime. As expected, the bounds go to 0 with increasing .
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Figure 2: Upper and lower accuracy bounds for MWD vs. upper accuracy bounds
for ReLU and Sigmoid networks.
We stress that MWD lower bound in Figure 2 gives the provable margin of
resistance of MWD networks with respect to adversarial attacks as measured on the
testing set. If the test set is a representative sample of the inputs that will be seen
while the net is in use, then Figure 2 can be interpreted as saying that, even with
optimally perturbed =0.2-adversarial examples, our MWD network still provides
an accuracy of over 80%. Of course, this guarantee does not hold if the examples
to be predicted on come from a wildly different distribution. In other words, our
accuracy guarantee is conditional to a given input distribution — as is typical in
machine learning.
MWD vs. adversarially-trained ReLU networks. Including adversarial ex-
amples in the training set is the most common method used to make neural networks
more resistant to adversarial attacks [GSS14, MMS+17]. Therefore, it is interesting
to compare the lower bound guarantees for MWD networks with the upper bounds
on the true -attack accuracies ReLU networks trained via a mix of normal and
heuristically generated adversarial examples. For brevity, we omit the results for
Sigmoid networks, as they were consistently inferior to those for ReLU networks.
Before training on each batch of 100 labeled examples, we add candidate adversarial
examples to the batch in one of three different ways.
• ReLU(FGSM) and ReLU(I-FSGM): for each (x, t) in the batch, we con-
struct a potential adversarial example x˜ via (3) or (4), and we feed both (x, t)
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Figure 3: Upper and lower accuracy bounds for MWD vs. upper accuracy bounds
for ReLU networks trained with adversarial examples.
and (x˜, t) to the network for training.
• ReLU(PGD): for each (x, t) in the batch, we perform 100 steps of projected
gradient descent from a point chosen at random in B(x) ∩ [0, 1]n; denoting
by x′ the ending point of the projected gradient descent, we feed both (x, t)
and (x′, t) to the network for training.
The candidate adversarial examples were generated with  = 0.3, which is consistent
with [MMS+17]. Due to the high computational cost of adversarial training (and
in particular, PGD adversarial training), we performed one run, and we trained the
networks for 10 epochs, which was sufficient for their accuracy to plateau.
In Figure 3 we compare the previously reported accuracy upper and lower bounds
for MWD, with the accuracy upper bounds for adversarially-trained ReLU networks.
The accuracy upper bounds for adversarially-trained ReLU networks are obtained
via I-FGSM attacks, which are more effective than PGD or FGSM attacks against
such networks. We see that the upper bounds for MWD networks are above the
upper bounds for adversarially-trained ReLU networks for all but the smallest at-
tacks (for  ≥ 0.05). Furthermore, we see that the lower bounds for MWD networks
are above the upper bounds for adversarially-trained ReLU networks for a good
range of attack sizes (0.05 ≤  ≤ 0.25), in spite of both upper and lower bounds
being conservative. Together, this indicates that at least in the training regimes
we explored, MWD trained without the benefit of adversarial examples offer more
resistance to adversarial attacks than ReLU networks trained with the benefit of
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adversarial examples.
Training MWD networks with pseudogradients vs. standard gradients.
We compared the performance achieved by training MWD networks with standard
gradients, and with pseudogradients. We considered networks with 512, 512, 512,
and 10 units, where the first three layers consisted of a random mix of And and
Nand units, while the last layer was composed of Nand units (the results do not
depend strongly on such unit choices). After 30 epochs of training, pseudogradients
yielded (96.79± 0.17)% accuracy, while regular gradients only (86.35± 0.75)%. On
smaller networks, that should be easier to train, the gap even widened: for networks
with 128, 128, and 10 units, pseudogradients yielded (95.00± 0.29)% accuracy and
regular gradients only (82.40 ± 3.72)%. This indicates the need of resorting to
pseudogradients for training MWDnetworks.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we advanced the state of the art in producing neural networks re-
sistant to adversarial attacks via two contributions. We introduced MWD network
units, whose non-linear structure makes them intrinsically resistant to attacks, along
with techniques for training networks including MWD units. We also provided an
efficient technique for computing accuracy guarantees for networks under adversar-
ial attacks, showing that MWD networks provide guarantees that are superior to
common network types such as ReLU and sigmoid networks.
Much work remains to be done, including extending the results to convolutional
networks, and exploring the design space of trainable nonlinear structures is clearly
an interesting endeavor.
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